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Social Life of Values 
(cross-cultural construction of realities) 
 
“The undermining of standards of seriousness is almost complete, with the ascendancy of 
a culture whose most intelligible, persuasive values are drawn from the entertainment 
industries”(Sontag, 2001, 273) 
Abstract 
The case of the Danish “cartoon war” was a premonition of things to come: accelerated 
social construction of inequalities and their accelerated symbolic communication, 
translation and negotiation. New uses of values in organizing and managing inequalities 
emerge. Values lead active social life as bourgeois virtues (McCloskey, 2006), their 
subversive alternatives or translated “memes” of cultural history. Since social life of 
values went global and online, tracing their hybrid manifestations requires cross-
culturally competent domestication (Magala, 2005) as if they were “memes” manipulated 
for further reengineering. Hopes are linked to emergent concepts of “microstorias” 
(Boje,2002), bottom-up, participative, open citizenship (Balibar,2004), disruption of 
stereotypical branding in mass-media (Sennett, 2006). However, Kuhn’s opportunistic 
deviation from Popperian evolutionary epistemology should fade away with other hidden 
injuries of Cold War, to free our agenda for the future of social sciences in general and 
organizational sciences in particular (Fuller, 2000, 2003).  
 
Key words: complex identities, political paradigms, cross-cultural competence, 
professional evolution, managing inequalities, intersubjective falsificationism 
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1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary complex societies and their increasingly complex processes of knowledge 
production and dissemination are imagined under the powerful shadow cast by the 
biological theories of evolution. While we do not believe in linear and inevitable Progress 
along the Enlightenment lines (having discovered empirical falsification of “grand 
narratives” in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and having traced religious roots of 
secularized bureaucracies to the perseverance of professional corporate bureaucracies), 
we do tacitly believe that development and changes in our societies can ultimately be 
explained and brought under human control, at least to a certain – manageable – extent. 
Popper’s vision of “piecemeal social engineering” of an open society opposed to the 
utopian ideology of the closed ones remains philosophically attractive, but calls for a new 
defense in view of the relativistic uses of Kuhn’s concept of “Gestalt switch”. Imagining 
our societies and our knowledge about them we tend to accept tacitly or explicitly that 
even the most random changes ultimately can find meaningful interpretation according to 
a variant of causal explanation, perhaps at the price of accepting its sophisticated 
functional form. These evolutionary and biological explanations and analogies are 
resisted in social sciences, where ideas of ‘sociobiology’ had been discredited as an 
updated version of ‘social darwinism’ a la E.O. Wilson, but continue to re-emerge as neo-
sociobiologies under various guises of ‘holistic darwinism’ (Corning, 2005) or 
‘machiavellian intelligence’ (Byrne, Whiten, 1988, Whiten, Byrne, 1997). While they 
merit attention, they should be vigorously opposed, since their simplified and popularized 
versions disseminate a mistaken belief in profoundly false and potentially dangerous 
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analogy between biological ‘genes’ and sociocultural ‘memes’ (both of which 
presumably can be controlled by specific gatekeepers, for instance peer control, 
performing a role of artificial ‘natural selection’). This tacitly accepted analogy is 
misleading. History of human societies, sociocultural history of growing complexity and 
intensity of human cooperation and conflicts is not carried by “hidden core memes” of 
sociobiological, holistic evolution (no matter whether we call this hidden “core” meme a 
divine Revelation or a secular Reason and no matter how we explain the opening of the 
path of rational development of complex societies towards a more “perfect union” with 
itself or higher being). “Memes” – or what could possibly pass for their rough equivalents 
– are sociocultural constructs, which are continuously renegotiated, translated, 
reinterpreted, re-communicated and reconstructed throughout history.  Sociocultural 
imagination - which stores and re-engineers such constructs for future uses - is fuelled by 
core values (embedded in social and individual memories as bourgeois virtues and as 
multiple types of alternative or counter-values: bohemian, heretic, subversive, protestant, 
etc.) which prompt multiple communities to redefine, retranslate and re-communicate 
speeches, texts and other cultural units, using them as resources in political, economic 
and cultural struggles. In the course of these multiple interactions, transmissions and 
translations - old and new inequalities generate both ‘renaissance’ of interest in inherited 
‘memes’ and organized ‘deletion’ of other memes (or of their former custodians). Growth 
of knowledge requires some growth of social amnesia about selected (‘revived’, revised 
and subsequently forgotten) aspects of sociocultural memes. The forgotten role of the 
Islamic centers of learning in transmitting the ancient Greek and Roman heritage to the 
Latin Europe may serve as an illustration of the process of re-engineering stored 
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“memes” of “classical Greek and Roman heritage”. Historical deletion of the Arab and 
Muslim contribution to the recovery, preservation, refinement and transition of the 
ancient Greek and Roman texts for Christian Europeans before the outbreak of the Italian 
Renaissance is the first case in point (“The arabization of European Renaissance”). Had 
this deleting been prevented, we might have gained a better insight into the crucial role of 
communities of interpretative practice, into multi-linguistic and multicultural process of 
transmitting “memes” and into emergent regularities of apparently random ‘memic’ drift 
of meaning through translations and retranslations in the process of sociocultural 
evolution. Incommensurability does not emerge with the scientific research communities 
pursuing methodological puzzle-solving a la Kuhn. It puzzled the first translators of 
Aristotle from Greek into Syriac, from Syriac into Arabic, from Arabic into Latin, and 
from Latin into Italian, German or Polish. However, we are often prevented by our 
narrow-minded defense of existing political and cultural inequalities and parochial 
philosophy of knowledge (scientific, religious, political, moral, economic, etc.) from 
defusing potential growth of conflicts out of control. Contemporary international crisis 
caused by the Danish cartoons is a case in point (“Clash of Inequalities: Bourgeois 
Virtues and Global Immigrants”). In order to avoid triggering a potential spiral of 
violence and destruction one has to preserve the minimal consensus for the ongoing 
negotiations at the partially virtual agoras of the future – and minimal consensus of a 
professional research community is precisely the type of a community of scientific 
knowledge presupposed by the falsificationist and evolutionary epistemology of 
intersubjective scientific knowledge suggested by K.R. Popper. Popper’s falsificationist 
and evolutionary epistemology has to be recovered from behind the smokescreen of T. 
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Kuhn’s crudely sociobiological and Cold War – driven theory of scientific revolutions 
imagined as a sequence of paradigmatic dictatorships separated by sudden ‘Gestalt 
switches’.  The resuscitation of Popper’s philosophy of science could help in developing 
more mature, moral, democratic and liberal communities of knowledge. The latter could 
turn out to tread a superior “third way” between communities led by two rival visions. 
Popperian vision is opposed to tacit acceptance of either the neopositivist dogmatism (cf. 
Wilson, 1998), as is usually the case in mainstream academic establishments, or to tacit 
acceptance of the relativist Kuhn, as tends to be the case in social sciences and the 
humanities, where postmodernists “adopted” Kuhn in their struggles against 
neopositivism as the dominant ideology of academic institutions (“Emergent cross-
cultural competence: interdisciplinary, interparadigmatic, intermediating”).  In their quest 
for defense weapon against neopositivism, these postmodern social constructivists had 
embraced radical incommensurability thesis (pronounced by Kuhn about two successive 
paradigms which cannot be compared along the single line) and applied it to their 
footholds in the academia, which they wanted to defend against the neopositivist 
onslaught.  They pronounced  Kuhn’s theory of Gestalt switch (scientific revolution) to 
be a defensive doctrine preventing different paradigmatic communities of learning from 
clashing while functioning within the same academic institutional environment: 
 
“What we call progress in science, for Kuhn, is not then movement from a less to a more 
objectively accurate paradigm.(…) No longer was it possible to justify science as a quest 
for truth. (Gergen, 1999, 54)          
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 2. The arabization of the European Renaissance 
 
Most historians of European culture agree that Greek writings – of which Ptolemy’s on 
astronomy and of Aristotle on philosophy are the most popular cases in point – did not 
resurface in hands of Italian monks busily preparing the cultural explosion of the 
Renaissance. From Plato’s times, when texts started to win against speech as the main 
“carrier” of transmitted cultural knowledge, they led a very intensive and turbulent life. 
In fact, what emerged from the workshops and monasteries of medieval translators, to be 
codified and accepted as standard versions of classical texts (the processes of this 
codification and acceptance continue until the present day) was a series of texts, all of 
which had already had a considerable and complex history and a very mixed, hybrid 
pedigree. First, most of the texts, which had been circulating in and among Greek cities, 
have been carried eastwards along with the process of cultural exports known as 
“hellenization”. This process involved, among others, frequent translations from Greek 
originals into Syriac, Pahlavi, or Sanskrit, and later on, into Arabic. One should not forget 
that the Greek scientific and philosophical texts from the Hellenistic period were in 
themselves often based on translations and imports from different, more ancient sources 
and languages. For instance, some elements of astronomic terminology, like names of the 
signs of Zodiac, came from Mesopotamia, others from Egypt, and some names of planets 
have been taken over from Sumerian or Akkadian. On top of that the ancient Greek, in 
which original texts had once been written down, differed already from the daily Greek 
used by the inhabitants of Byzantium, who spread them out eastwards – so that native 
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Greek speakers, usually linked to Christian communities, were translating into Arabic 
from what must have been a dead language for them.  Moreover, the interest in Greek 
originals and market demand were sharply differentiated: philosophy, medicine and 
astronomy were by far the most popular, but even these texts have been transmitted with 
a number of changes and interventions, which make us wonder how many different 
communities and schools of translators, compilers, researchers, commentators and 
professionals left their mark on what we nowadays attribute to a single ancient author. 
What kind of classic Greek texts were Arab readers getting? How many collective 
Aristotles or Ptolemys left their imprint on the final product and who made vital decisions 
what to cut and what to leave before the final product had been launched and 
disseminated? This is not a purely historical question. What Arab readers were getting - 
had subsequently been retranslated into medieval Latin, only to be later rendered in 
European vernaculars, and thus what Arabs were getting then, we were getting “now”, 
that is during the ‘proper’ Renaissance. This cultural transmission or cross-cultural 
transfer was not a simple passage: 
 
“They had to be adapted to educational requirements, and changing times necessitated 
certain changes in emphasis. Furthermore, many a great author appeared long-winged, so 
that abridgements and paraphrases were deemed more suitable… In the case of some 
authors, commentaries written on their works provided more information and had become 
more meaningful than the original text.” (Rosenthal, 1975, 10) 
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Some historians are thus posing a question about the actual ‘content’ of the classic Greek 
texts as they were received by the Muslim Arab communities of learning in the long 
period of “arabization” of the Greek heritage (8th to 11th centuries). What were the 
accepted results of translating, copying, editing, commenting, changing, modifying, 
amending and adapting on the ultimate text, which readers had been getting? If texts had 
been already circulating in their Syriac and Persian translations and had been studied 
along with the Greek originals found after five hundred years in Byzantium, what were 
the choices made by translators and editors? And what exactly was the input of Arab 
translators, editors, commentators and professionals on further evolution of these 
“memes” of sociocultural evolution, these “bodies of knowledge” to be studied and 
applied? To make matters worse, historians are quite conscious that speaking of the 
‘arabization’ of the classic Greek heritage they are touching only the tip of an iceberg in 
truly cross-cultural archeology of knowledge: 
 
“What took place between the eighth and eleventh centuries in Muslim intellectual 
society was something quite different from ‘the survival of Greek culture’. One might 
consider that historians have rarely, if ever, spoken of the ‘Arabization’ of late medieval 
Latin culture, the ‘Romanization’ of sixteenth and seventeenth century England, or the 
‘Germanization’ of late nineteenth century European science. Yet all these designations 
must at least be considered if such immanent force be granted the ‘Hellenistic element’ 
during the era of Arabic translation and nativization.”(Montgomery, 2000, 91) 
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Montgomery speaks of the displacement; the original author, for instance, Greek 
astronomer and mathematician, Ptolemy, has been, according to him, displaced by a new 
collective body of successive translators and editors, ‘a community of translator-
interpreter-revisers’, some of whose representatives openly stated their contribution to the 
final shape of the text, by claiming in the preface, as did Thabit ihn Qurrah, that: 
 
“The work was translated from the Greek into the Arabic language by Ishaq ibn Hunyan 
ibn Ishaq al-Mutatabbib for Abu us-Saqr Ismail ibn Balbul and was corrected by Thabit 
ibn Qurra from Harran. Everything that appears in this book, wherever and in whatever 
place or margin it may occur, whether it constitute commentary, summary, expansion of 
the text, explanation, simplification, explication for the sake of clearer understanding, 
correction, allusion, improvement, and revision, derives from the hand of Thabit ibn 
Qurra al-Harrani.” (Kunitzsch, 1974, 68) 
 
Since the European translations of Greek classics from their most accessible Arab 
versions (the reconquest of Granada, Cordoba, Toledo gave medieval European monks 
access to considerable libraries) became very numerous in the 12th century, some 
historians suggest that we should speak of moving the beginning of the European 
Renaissance, which owes its name to the re-birth of interest in ancient authors, to this 
period, or at least to speak of two renaissances. The first one started in the 12th century, 
mainly with the newly accelerated social mobility, economic growth (which brought 
about the emergence and gradual improvements of paper mills and increased demand for 
books), political turmoil and cultural innovation, of which public city schools and 
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translations of classics merit particular attention. This first renaissance paved the way for 
the second one, the one of the 15th and 16th centuries, codified in Jacob Burchardt’s “The 
Culture of Renaissance in Italy” and remembered for the achievements of Copernicus, 
Galileo, da Vinci or Michelangelo. Earlier heroes were mostly busy translating from the 
Arabic: Adelard of Bath, Gerard of Cremona, John of Seville, Hugh of Santalla, 
Burgundio of Pisa or William of Moerbecke or they were teachers at the first developing 
universities of Bologna and Paris, conscious that they are bringing the classic works, 
“hidden” in Greek and Arabic versions, out into the “open”, making them accessible to 
the Latin - speaking world. However, these translators and teachers, who had relied so 
heavily on Arab libraries in laying groundwork for the European cultural Renaissance, 
have developed an interesting cultural strategy of separating the Arab language and 
culture from religion and politics of Islam and of downplaying the role of Arab 
intellectual elites in preserving the classical heritage, not least for themselves. The 
deleting of the Arabs from cultural history of Europe had already started – exactly at the 
same moment that their contribution to the European growth was most crucial and 
unique. Historians point out that the conquered Arab cities in Spain represented a world 
of civilizational superiority and tolerant religious difference. Latin translators came from 
feudal societies and monastic social environments, suspicious of and hostile to what they 
must have perceived as decadent sophistication, tolerant intellectual atmosphere and 
sensual pleasures of complex urban environment (in a sense they must have looked at the 
glories of Cordoba as some Muslim religious thinkers look at London or New York 
today). Further, translators also set out to “nativize” texts they were rendering and thus 
after the first generation of Latin translations, in which translators hesitate between 
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Greek, Arab or Latin terms, a definite increase and stabilization of Latinized terminology 
become visible. Gradual ‘purging’ of Arab terms was not an organized and synchronized 
action, but it became particularly thorough in textbooks and it has been much more 
systematic than former “Arabization” of Greek originals. Gradually, even star names 
imported from the Arabic disappeared from the European sources. This de-Arabization of 
knowledge rested on two assumptions: that Greek (ancient) and Latin (contemporary) 
were the proper languages for developing and transmitting relevant knowledge, and 
second, that Arabs were simply temporary caretakers of the Greek legacy: 
 
“The progressive deleting of the Arabs from their own ‘legacy’ is largely an untold story 
of medieval European history.(…) By 1400, questions surrounding the learning of Arabic 
were gone. (…) Arabic was never adopted, except on most temporary basis, as a topic of 
study within the universities. Such adoption, of course, would have made a great deal of 
practical sense, given the vast amount of material in this language – even today, more of 
Aristotle exists in Arabic than in Greek or Latin. But the ‘tongue of the Saracens’ was 
apparently seen as being too difficult, too foreign, and in the end too unnecessary to 
become an object of study among schoolmen.” (Montgomery, 2000, 172) 
 
Is it possible that telling the untold story of the Arab share in the European Renaissance 
might contribute to the cultivation of a truly cross-cultural competence allowing to bridge 
the differences, which separate the “clashing civilizations” at present?  If so, we should 
reconstruct the process of deleting of the Arab link in the process of a transmission, 
translation and development of the ideas expressed by ancient Greek and Roman in their 
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classical texts.  Far from being a specialist quest limited to remote corners of academic 
institutions, it might become a significant contribution to a crucial contemporary 
discussion about multicultural society and management of inequalities.     
 
3. Clash of inequalities: bourgeois virtues and global immigrants. 
 
On September 30, cartoons by twelve artists appeared in Jyllands Posten (a conservative 
Danish daily). One of the cartoons presented turbaned head of the Prophet, with a burning 
fuse protruding from it as if Muhammad was carrying a bomb on his head. Another 
showed the prophet trying to stop the crowd of martyrs from queuing before the gates of 
paradise by exclaiming that he had run out of virgins. Cartoons might have remained 
unnoticed by the Islamic population of Danish capital (ca. 5000), but their religious 
leaders made a case against what they perceived as de facto discrimination on educational 
and job markets.   
 
These local religious leaders of Danish Muslims were presiding over a marginalized and 
discriminated segment of Danish population, which does not feel embedded in broader 
civil society nor is adequately represented by local political parties. When their protests 
failed to elicit responses they had initially counted on (on the part of local authorities, job 
agencies, employers’ organizations, trade unions, Christian communities and 
organizations, and state authorities), they lodged a formal complaint against a blasphemy 
intended to hurt their religious feelings, asking the regional public persecutor in Viborg to 
investigate the case and to punish the perpetrators. On January 6, 2006, the regional 
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public persecutor in Viborg announced that investigations into cartoons have been 
terminated since no evidence of illegal activity, i.e. punishable offense, has been found. 
  
Meanwhile, the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Abul-Gheit had publicly criticized 
anti-Islamic cartoons published in Denmark (November 2005) and made use of the 
Future Forum (a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of Muslim countries of the 
Middle East) in Bahrain, calling for joint diplomatic action. Their declarations had no 
immediate influence upon the course of Danish justice or European Union’s media 
policy, but they managed to mobilize shop owners and food retail chains in their own 
countries. Shop owners started boycotting Danish dairy products and symbolically 
trampled upon Danish flags spread on pavements outside of boycotting shops (which 
increased media visibility of the protests). Very soon crowds of fanatics, sometimes with 
governments’ approval (in Syria, Iran) and sometimes without (Libya, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan) attacked Danish diplomatic buildings, setting some of them on fire. People 
died. Could this be avoided, if local Danish authorities paid attention to ther original 
declaration of Danish imams? In this declaration, we read, among others: 
 
 “We urge you – on behalf of thousands of believing Muslims – to give us an opportunity 
of having constructive contact with the press and particularly with the relevant decision-
makers, not briefly, but with a scientific methodology and planned and long-term 
program seeking to make views approach each other and remove misunderstandings 
between the two parties involved. Since we do not wish for Muslims to be accused of 
being backward and narrow, likewise we do not wish for Danes to be accused of 
 13
ideological arrogance either. When this relationship is back on the track, the result will 
bring satisfaction, an underpinning of security and stable relations, and a flourishing 
Denmark for all that live here. 
We call your attention to this case, and place it in your hands, in such a way that we 
together may think and have an objective dialogue regarding how an appropriate exit can 
be found for these crises in a way which does not violate the freedom of speech, but 
which at the same time does not offend the feelings of Muslims either.”(Jyllands Posten, 
2006, 6)  
 
Since the only response was prime minister’s stern reminder that they are free to turn to 
the courts, the imams started lobbying in the Middle East, where events soon got out of 
control. Fundamentalist newspapers in the Arab world (e.g. Al-Najaf al Balagh published 
by Shiites in Iraq or Jama’at-i Islami published by fundamentalists in Pakistan) supported 
the demand for a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the Danes and 
for a public apology. Pakistani newspaper mentioned above went further and offered 
financial reward for any true Muslim who would kill the cartoon artists defending honor 
of the entire community of the faithful. On November 14, 2005, a radical fundamentalist 
leader of Islamic youth in Pakistan, Shahid Pervez Gilani, allegedly promised half a 
million rupees for accomplishing this murder. His press spokesman had later denied those 
allegations, claiming that his party embraced democracy and rejected violence, but media 
managed to carry this message around the Islamic world. 
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At this point – from mid-January to mid-February 2006 – Muslim crowds turned violent 
during street manifestations destroying not only Danish diplomatic buildings (which had 
been burnt in Damascus and Beirut), but turning their wrath against symbols of “the 
West” in general and the United States and European Union in particular (young 
Palestinians torched the seat of the EU representative to the Palestinian Authority). Street 
demonstrations, most of them violent, some involving loss of life, took place in Iraq, 
Lebanon, Kashmir, Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the cartoon crisis turned out to be 
short lived. Egyptian government threatened with boycotting of Danish products but 
failed to implement the threat, while Saudi Arabia recalled their ambassador from 
Denmark. At the end of February demonstrations died down.  
 
Meanwhile, responses on both sides of the Christian-Muslim divide became more 
differentiated and less clear-cut. On the one hand, the responses of the Arab societies 
have not been as one-sided and fundamentalist as TV images of arsonist crowds throwing 
Danish products out of supermarkets and fighting riot police would suggest. Although it 
was hard to find this information in Europe’s main dailies, there were brave Arab 
journalists - in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt – who did reprint Danish cartoons in their 
newspapers and weeklies. In spite of the fact that cartoons were reproduced fuzzily in 
order to diminish their impact and in spite of the fact that they have been provided with 
condemning comments, some of these journalists had been arrested, and although all of 
them were eventually set free on bail, some of them still await their trials. The list of 
courageous Arab journalists includes Mohammad al-Asaadi (editor of “Yemen 
Observer”), Akram Sabra  and Kamal al-Aalafi (editors of, respectively, “Al Hurryia” 
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and “Al-Rai al-Aam”, both in Yemen), Kahel Bousaad and Berkane Bouderbala (editors 
of, respectively “Errisala” and “Iqraa”, both of which are Algerian weeklies). One should 
stress the fact that these arrests and accompanying closure of publications happened in 
2006, after street riots had spread. Originally, in October 2005, when two Jordanian 
weeklies (“Al-Mehwar” edited by Hisham Khalidi and “The Star”) and two newspapers – 
Jordan’s “Al Ghad” and Egypt’s “Al Fagr” reprinted the Danish cartoons, the reprints 
attracted little attention and have not yet been seized by any party framing them as a 
casus belli. However, when Jihad Momani reprinted the very same cartoons in Jordanian 
weekly “al-Shihan” on February 2, 2006, he was immediately arrested and had his 
weekly closed down by alarmed authorities.   
 
On the other hand, the “Western” world had also been far from uniform in its response to 
the “Danish cartoon crisis”. The US media refused to reproduce the cartoons and so did 
the media in UK. On February 15, 2006, the European Parliament accepted a resolution 
condemning acts of violence against Danish diplomatic buildings and expressed 
solidarity with Danes and other attacked Europeans. The European Union upheld the 
rights of Danish press to exercise its right for free expression of opinion on all topics, 
including religion, but originally expressed concern with the “Danish satirical and 
offensive cartoons” (Xavier Solana). Gradually, the official position of the EU became 
more pro-Danish and less pro-Muslim and on February 26 ministers of foreign affairs 
issued a declaration after their meeting in Brussels. They regretted that Arab audiences 
had perceived these cartoons as offensive, but did not describe them as offensive 
themselves and offered no apologies.  
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 Meanwhile, on February 25, Dutch minister of developmental aid and cooperation, Agnes 
van Ardenne – van der Hoeven, published an article in London-based Arab newspaper 
“Asharq Al-Awsat” (reprinted later by “Yemen Times”) under the title “The cartoon 
crisis, a distorted picture. According to her, the secular point of view, upheld by the 
Danish authors and publishers of Muhammad cartoons, is based on an assumption that 
religion is outdated and had been historically superseded by a superior – rational and  
secular culture. Secular fundamentalists pocket religion in marginal areas of individual 
social life, closer to personal hobbies than social and civil virtues. This is wrong, because 
it focuses on wrong aspect of the conflict. Arab world is suffering not because it is 
predominantly Muslim, but because it is predominantly ruled by undemocratic regimes, 
which waste chances for improvement.  Agnes van Ardenne quoted president Roosevelt’s 
famous war speech (State of the Union address of 1941), in which the US president 
mentioned four basic liberties (which subsequently contributed to the creation of the 
Declaration on Universal Rights of Man); the first of them was indeed freedom of 
expression, but it was closely followed by freedom of religious worship. Exercising our 
rights according to the former we should not take undue liberties with the latter, since our 
enemy is not a “religious superstition” but “political tyranny” (no matter whether it is 
justified with a secular ideology or religious doctrine). Both her article and reprints of 
cartoons by Muslim journalists create a potential agora for discussing future ‘cartoon 
crises’ by demonstrating that there is a space for a re-negotiation of meaning of religious 
values in contemporary social life, even during a growing crisis. Such re-negotiation 
would require a comparative analysis of the role of religious values in social life and ana 
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analysis of the conflicting values (Danish choice of freedom of expression at the expense 
of stigmatized immigrants). Not many Western or Muslim intellectuals offer guidance in 
this respect. Rare positive cases in point include, for instance, a critical reconstruction of 
the role of Christianity and of Catholic Church in shaping western political institutions 
(cf. Mouffe, 1999), the role of organized religion in shaping contemporary political 
philosophy and managerial ideology of institutional science (cf. Fuller, 2003) and 
analyses of the dismantling of ideological walls (Said, 2000, Hussein, 2002). Mouffe 
edited a volume of critical essays on Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s studies of “Political 
Theology” and “Roman Catholicism and Political Form” from the 1920ies. He 
reconstructed the “rationalism” of the Catholic Church and traced institutional logic of 
bureaucratic politics (which offers an institutional demonstration of this rationality) to 
contemporary political systems and especially to the uneasy relationship between the 
executive and legislative branch of government. According to his leftist commentators, 
he had recognized crucial role of “political management” in overcoming parliamentary 
crises and opposed “objective-economic” approach, which dominated both Marxist and 
neoliberal thinking, condemning them to either subversive conspiracy of a single party 
(Marxist core values of building a classless society at any cost) or to alienating 
parliamentary deal-making (liberal core values of continuing coercion-free dialogue no 
matter how coercive are the experienced constraints of inequalities by scapegoated 
groups) : 
“Schmitt takes up a position against what he sees as the dominant tendencies of 
Catholicism at the time; he criticizes its bending towards a private and subjective belief 
(…), he maintains Catholicism looses its way when it seeks only to bring another soul to 
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a world condemned to the grip of economic and technical rationality. (…) He seeks (…) a 
model which makes it possible to affirm the primacy of the political over economics, of 
decision over impersonal structural constraints, of the Idea over matter.”(Colliot-Thélène, 
1999, 146-7)   
 Schmitt’s idea of a political democracy involved an assumed homogeneity of members 
of an imagined political community. It was very restrictive : 
 
“For him democracy requires the exclusion and ‘if the need arises – the elimination or 
eradication of heterogeneity’.”(Preuss, 1999, 171) 
 
This question of homogeneity and eliminated heterogeneity arose at the core of the 
Danish cartoon crisis. Global flows brought Muslim immigrants into an environment, 
where they stood out as “heterogeneous”. Persistent social inequalities forced immigrant 
Muslim communist into a defensive fold of imagined religious community. While 
discriminated against in housing, jobs and education, they could feel different but equal 
to their Danish hosts in their religious worship (which also legitimized their traditional 
family roles thus providing a buffer against secularization of the youth). When cartoons 
ridiculed even their religious community, without at the same time offering a consolation 
of increased care for them as “underdogs” and without genuine will to redress some of 
the other inequalities – Danish imams realized they were loosing the only trump they still 
had in their social game for recognition and acceptance. Can we organize a game, in 
which consequences of playing trump cards by imagined or real “underdogs” on a global 
scale will be less dangerous? In order to answer this question, let us examine knowledge 
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communities, which are responsible for producing socially acceptable knowledge, which, 
in turn, influences our behavior in crises. 
 
4. Emergent cross-cultural competence: interdisciplinary, interparadigmatic, 
intermediating. 
 
Not all religious values are lost in an interdisciplinary translation from principles of 
conduct for a religious sect in an originally hostile environment to universal principles of 
research community devoted to a scientific paradigm competing against other paradigms 
and other professional communities. Some of them survive in philosophies or historical 
reconstructions of ways and means of generating socially acceptable scientific 
knowledge. Commenting on Popper-Kuhn debate, which had taken place in early 
seventies and decided about further development of contemporary philosophy of science, 
Steve Fuller points out that the construction and maintenance of moral, legal and 
institutional preconditions for free inquiry and ongoing criticism depends on a 
generalized loyalty to this free inquiry but without blind commitment to any particular 
theory of paradigm. Upholding standards of criticism is more important than having 
one’s theory defended at their expense and these standards (linked to falsifiability, crucial 
experiments and the like) are maintained independently of theories, in the defense of 
which they are, with varying luck, evoked and applied. However, this Popperian “virtue” 
of a rational member of western research community (who remains faithful to the spirit of 
critical inquiry, even if their own theories suffer as a result of acting in this spirit), has 
eroded under the influence of both contradictions in Popper’s own philosophy of science 
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(expressed in a number of publications, of which the evolutionary epistemology 
presented in “Objective Knowledge” is the case in point) and under the influence of 
Thomas Kuhn’s cold war ideology of mobilization of the scientific elites disguised as a 
“theory of scientific revolutions”, which justifies defense of status quo by members of 
“normal science” (established professional communities in hierarchic academic 
bureaucracies) and unwillingness to subject one’s own and one’s colleagues’ theories to 
too much criticism (especially from the point of rival paradigms, which are stigmatized as 
‘unscientific’ and ignored): 
 
“Science policy has regressed from a struggle for recognition to a struggle for survival. 
As universities increasingly abandon, or attenuate, the institution of tenure, and 
researchers are forced to depend on external grants, scientists have become all too keenly 
aware that one bad decision can ruin the material basis of their entire career. (…) To 
Popper and his students, this strategic mentality, characteristic of Kuhnian normal 
science, revealed science’s captivity to its social and material conditions. Kierkegaard 
helped Popper forge the link between the critical spirit of classical Athens and the 
Protestant Reformation by making decision making central to his thought. Indeed, Popper 
is not unfairly been treated as a scientific existentialist.”(Fuller, 2003, 108-9) 
 
Fuller’s use of religious analogy merits attention, because it continues some intuitions 
expressed by Feyerabend (who traced analogies between “progress” in arts and sciences 
of the 18th century trying to demonstrate their shared underlying “mechanism” for 
ensuring professional peer control and creating impression of “progress”) and compares 
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directly episodes from institutional history of Christianity and cases from institutional 
history of western academic establishments. Fuller  believes that Popper’s “Catholic” 
approach (falsificationism being the tacit “dogma” of anti-dogmatic academic 
bureaucracies) with “Protestant” rebellions of his students (Paul Feyerabend springs to 
mind, as an anarchist, and as a true heir to Rousseau’s comparison of arts, sciences and 
morality) has been a much more fortunate translation of the religious message into a 
philosophical guide for methodology of scientific inquiry than Kuhnian “sectarian” vision 
of paradigmatic and generational plots disturbing the continuity of “normal science’s” 
historical development. Kuhn’s theory of rival paradigms succeeding each other for 
periods of domination over rival paradigms in fact turned out to be a convenient 
ideological alibi both for the established neopositivists unwilling to rock the academic 
boat (and willing to freeze too much interparadigmatic rivalry) and for the representatives 
of the postmodernist coalitions fighting for survival within these academic bureaucracies 
(willing to protects themselves from the dominant neopositivist orthodoxy in feminist, 
multicultural, postcolonial and other niches). Fuller reconstructs Popper’s philosophy of 
science as a variant of ‘scientific existentialism’ and attributes the origins of this 
philosophical doctrine to the attempted synthesis between the critical spirit of the ancient 
Greeks (‘classical Athens’) and the Protestant Reformation (as the reform of an organized 
religion, which gave individual more chances than a professional bureaucracy of a 
Catholic church would be willing to concede). This is the genesis of the Kierkegaard 
connection: 
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“Kierkegaard characterized Christianity as a ‘hypothesis’ that one voluntarily undertakes 
in the full knowledge that the consequences are solely one’s own – not God’s – 
responsibility. (…) Similarly, for Popper, when a scientific knowledge claim is falsified, 
the responsibility lies solely with the scientist who proposed it – and not nature’s failure 
to act in some desired fashion. The appropriate response is to hypothesise and test anew, 
not to rationalize the situation by claiming that the old hypothesis was ‘really’ true, but 
somehow the test fell victim to factors beyond the scientist’s control. (…) If this appears 
too high a standard, then science is in stasis. For Popper, science is indeed in stasis – a 
‘fallen’ state, a closed society, much as the Roman Catholic Church was when Martin 
Luther launched what became the protestant Reformation.”(Fuller, 2003, 110) 
 
Feyerabend’s call against this ‘stasis’, this ‘fallen’ state of scientific establishment, which 
arrogantly imposes a monopoly of academically produced knowledge on contemporary 
complex societies to the exclusion of all other types of knowledge (expressed in “Against 
Method” and discussed in the 1970ies, but forgotten shortly afterwards, cf. Feyerabend, 
1975, 1979) should thus, according to Fuller, be seen as the call for Protestant-like 
decentralization of scientific corporations (including universities, research institutes, 
think tanks and educational institutions), a passionate plea for ‘devolution’ of support for 
scientific projects to local communities and authorities, away from centralized 
megabureaucracies. No wonder that Fuller appeared as a witness in a recent trial in 
Pennsylvania, in which the claim of a board of education to equal treatment of intelligent 
design theory and theory of biological evolution during biology lessons in a public school 
(demanded by parents making use of their democratic rights) has been challenged by 
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those, who believe that public education should be limited to the theories approved of by 
academic establishments (and theory of intelligent design is not).  
 
There are limits to analogy between religious movement of Protestantism within 
Christianity dominated institutionally by the Catholic Church in Western Europe of the 
16th century and schools and polemics in contemporary philosophy of science (although 
the present revival of interest among scholars and scientists in the Popper-Kuhn, Lakatos-
Feyerabend debates is fairly symptomatic for a renewed interest in “criticism and the 
growth of knowledge”). These limits can best be summarized as a debate on relativism 
and are closely connected to social life of values. From the point of epistemological and 
methodological criticism of Popper’s philosophy of science two charges brought by 
philosophers of science stand out and will continue to stand out even if Kuhn’s theory of 
scientific revolutions is refuted and looses its popularity. The first is that Popper 
embraced evolutionary epistemology, which tacitly identifies an ability of an amoeba or 
of an Einstein to (biological) survival with this agent’s (Einstein’s or amoeba’s) 
rationality. Thus one assumes what should become known only after we understand 
evolutionary processes – rationality of carriers of ability to survive is measured with their 
survival and survival is then explained as a manifestation of their (superior) rationality” 
(cf., Chmielewski, 1995). A vicious circle becomes a real threat to our explanation: why 
do agents survive? Because they are rational. Why are they rational? Because they 
survive. The second charge is that theory of evolutionary epistemology with elements of 
falsificationism may be granted a status, which makes it immune to the very criticism it 
advocates with respect to every other theory: 
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 “There are no reasons to believe that Popper’s critical theory is criticizable, from which it 
follows that Popper’s theory of rationality, that made criticizability a condition of rational 
acceptance of a theory in science, and which denied such status to Marxism and 
psychoanalytical theories, turns out to be guilty of the same sin, is not distinguishable 
from them in this regard, and as a result, according to its own requirements, has to be – 
like them – rejected.”(Chmielewski, 1995, 229) 
  
This double trouble with relativism has been a permanent companion of contemporary 
philosophy of science. Apparent incompatibility of a theory of scientific rationality (the 
logic of scientific discovery based on falsificationism) and of a theory of sociocultural 
evolution (objective, or rather intersubjective knowledge based on evolutionary 
epistemology) is one of the more recent, Popperian, cases in point. One of the Polish 
critics of Popper, Adam Chmielewski, elegantly expresses his view on this 
incompatibility by defining it as Popperian attempt to harmonize Platonic vision of 
superior methodology of acquiring (scientific) knowledge with Darwinian vision of a 
superior reconstruction of the origins of evolving life, changing societies and developing 
knowledge. Complex societies deal with this danger of relativism by establishing formal 
procedures rather than imposing content-bound core dogmas. Some of the ambiguities 
can, indeed, be procedurally decided upon in a formal way. On December 20, 2005, the 
US court decided that theory of intelligent design does not have a scientific status and 
should not be part of a biological curriculum in public schools. Religious motivation of 
the followers of the theory of intelligent design had been quoted in justification of the 
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ruling. What would have been the outcome if Muslim complaint about Danish cartoons 
did result in the court case in Viborg?  
 
Pursuing the flawed rationalism of scientific communities (scientific rationality is 
supposedly based on logic, empiricism and falsificationism, but their clustering and 
applications evolve), one wonders what would be the community of knowledge, which 
could discuss the Danish cartoon incident as a relatively impartial third party equally 
acceptable to the Danish imams and Danish cartoon artists, Irish Catholics and Arab 
Muslims alike? Fuller quotes Popper as trying to persuade scientists to sign a version of a 
Hippocratic Oath in order to diminish harm they could inflict on mankind (as suppliers of 
military industrial complexes) and Feyerabend as suggesting “devolution of science 
funding from nation-states to local communities.”(Fuller, 2003, 213) These suggestions 
would indicate a necessity to search for methods of influencing, managing and 
embedding academic communities. However, followers of Popper and Feyerabend, or of 
Lakatos and Toulmin (to mention just some of the authors, who had contributed to the 
growing literature on principled behavior in spite of relativist shadow) do not seem to 
share their masters’ ambitions to act as public intellectuals. Kuhn had been conspicuously 
silent after the popper-Kuhn debate and stayed away from public intellectual’s platforms 
and media. Feyerabend did not, but remained an enfant terrible of a relatively narrow 
academic circle of post-Popperian philosophers of science and some postmodernists. 
Perhaps politicians and human rights activists could form a panel for cases like the one 
involving cartoons to defuse its latent terrorist potential? Agnes van Ardenne quotes 
actually existing networks of entrepreneurs, human rights activists, politicians, business 
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people, intellectuals, and media people, who come together in temporary projects (she 
quotes an anti-HIV virus campaign launched in Yemen’s capital Sana) or who are 
selected as laureates of an annual  “freedom award” (she mentions the one granted by the 
Dutch city of Middleburg). Would a panel composed of people from diverse religious, 
ethnic, professional, gender and age groups offer sufficient neutrality and command 
sufficient authority to be considered binding by the involved parties? These are pragmatic 
questions, but answers to both political (how to manage reconciliation of offenses and 
neutralization of inequalities) and cognitive (how to arrive at acceptable and critically 
legitimized knowledge about cross-cultural construction of social realities) questions 
depend on our ability to extend our cross-cultural competence to embrace “otherness” 
and heterogeneity, which had been doomed to exclusion in previous rounds of conflicts, 
clashes and incidents. Networking social spaces one has to remember about including 
those which had been systematically neglected.. The latter include predominantly 
ethnically and religiously “different” (different, that is, from the former working classes, 
which consisted mostly of peasants migrating to industrial cities) underclasses of EU 
urban centers. Immigrant labor filled the gaps in urban spaces and social care system left 
by upwardly mobile working class; but cannot fit into the same channels of upward 
mobility and does not have the resources to oppose dismantling of welfare state (whose 
former beneficiaries, working classes, moved up to the middle class and do not oppose it 
strongly enough either). Can management of secular and religious identities facilitate 
integration by a promise of palpable upward mobility?  Tracing social life of political 
values we should not forget those values, which may lead clandestine existence as 
religious ones and thus remain in need of cultural, political and managerial translation, or 
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do so in ways we do not “officially’ acknowledge or respond to. In both cases, we need a 
new approach to the interparadigmatic, intercultural, interdisciplinary translation, which 
can be accomplished: 
 
“by stretching the idea of ‘translation’ from the merely linguistic to the broader cultural 
level. This is a decisive but still enigmatic task, one that involves acknowledging certain 
impossibilities (‘nontranslatable’ ideas and forms) and looking for equivalences; 
scientific, literary, legal and religious ‘universals’.”(Balibar, 2004, 235) 
 
Thus having started with the idea of translation as a crucial “link” in the sociocultural 
evolution (the Arab input into the European Renaissance), which transmits “memes” 
through time and space, we arrive at the idea of intercultural translation (which goes 
beyond linguistic equivalents) and a plea to embrace the Popperian search for universals 
in spite of empirical failure to rescue them from the shadow of relativism, as a much 
more ambitious and promising alternative to Kuhn’s facile paradigmatic sectarianism. Let 
us repeat it once again. Social life of values is better served by Popperian ambiguities and 
incommensurabilities (which beg the question, but allow begging) than by Kuhnian 
enclosures (which question the beggars, but limit questioning).  Threat of relativism 
looms larger, but agenda is less restrictive. Are our professional communities able to face 
this challenge of revived Popper and Feyerabend or will they fall back upon Kuhnian 
alibis?    
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